On May 2, 2004, the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia (MPD) implemented a major restructuring of its Police Service Areas (PSAs) following in-depth analysis, public discussions and City Council review. The new structure was designed to enhance police services in District neighborhoods and increase community involvement in targeting crime. MPD aimed to accomplish this by aligning the PSAs more closely with DC neighborhoods, improving police coordination with other city services in addressing problems that affect crime, and giving Commanders the staffing flexibility to fight crime more effectively at the neighborhood level. The restructured plan reduced the number of PSAs from 83 to 44\(^1\), thus creating new boundaries for all of the PSAs as well as for five of the seven police districts.

**Background**

Policing for Prevention (PFP) is MPD’s community-oriented policing strategy. Under this strategy, uniformed patrol officers are assigned to PSAs. The PSAs are organized into seven police districts, which in turn comprise three Regional Operational Commands (ROCs): North, Central and East. Officers patrol their PSAs and respond to calls for service. PSAs are managed by a lieutenant, who is assisted by one or more sergeants depending on the size of the PSA and volume of work. The lieutenant is responsible for the actions of all members in his/her PSA and develops PSA plans in partnership with the community and city agencies to tackle crime and disorder problems. The commander, who oversees the district, is accountable for the results and behavior of PSA lieutenants and all activities in his/her district, and oversees decisions on staffing and deployment. The ROCs, led by an assistant chief, support crime-reduction strategies by coordinating tactics and manpower across districts, and ensuring that resources are being used in accordance with Departmental priorities and policies.

As with any plan, it is important to evaluate its success and identify areas for improvement after an appropriate period of time has passed. As a result of this, and in response to City Council legislation pertaining to the Budget Support Emergency Act of 2000, MPD began to study the efficacy of the PSA model, including whether the boundaries and staffing goals were still relevant.

Over the next year, MPD focused on the staffing portion of the project. Analysts sought to identify the number of officers needed in the PSAs given certain assumptions concerning time spent on patrol versus community policing activities, minimum dispatch-to-on-scene times and officer availability. The results of this staffing analysis, released in December 2001, revealed that a minimum of 200 additional officers were needed in the PSAs (1,769 total).

These findings shaped the Department’s approach to its analysis of the PSA boundaries. After determining the methodology of this task and making small shifts to the boundaries based on geographical considerations, Chief Charles H. Ramsey decided more significant changes were needed to reduce crime, handle the growing number of calls for service and better manage the PSAs. His vision began with the realization that these goals could be achieved by aligning the boundaries with those of the 39 Neighborhood Clusters—larger areas developed by the Office of

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\(^1\)Since May 2004, MPD has made one additional change to a PSA in the Sixth District: PSA 605 was split in half on September 30\(^{th}\), leaving the Sixth District with seven PSAs and the city with 45 PSAs.
Planning in collaboration with community partners in 2001. The Clusters were originally drawn to match “Natural Neighborhood” boundaries but were later adjusted, with input from community groups and individual citizens, to better accommodate areas with similar interests across the city. The Clusters were already being incorporated into the planning and delivery of other city services. The realignment plan, therefore, was predicated on the importance of the community in assisting the police in reducing crime—a cornerstone of Policing for Prevention.

Over the next 14 months, MPD fine-tuned the new PSA boundaries based on operational considerations, environmental impediments to effective patrol, and community opinion about what worked and did not work in the current model. Staff participated in gatherings of every size—from a citywide Summit to monthly Advisory Neighborhood Commission (ANC) meetings to individual discussions with residents and business owners—to ensure that community views were implemented into the plan.

These discussions underscored the importance of:

- Flexibility in PSA staff deployment,
- Aligning PSAs with neighborhoods or natural boundaries,
- Police visibility,
- A supportive network of city services, and
- The role of captains in the PSAs.

In addition, earlier research on the Department’s operational model revealed that district commanders had too wide a span of control. Prior to the realignment, commanders were overseeing between 14 and 19 subordinates. PSA Integrity, the ideal of the same PSA officers being available to respond to calls for service and identifiable to citizens in their PSA, was being threatened by a high percentage of cross-dispatched calls for service. Further, MPD did not have a large enough pool of lieutenants uniquely suited to oversee the diverse and demanding responsibilities of the PSAs.

Recommendations were made to merge smaller PSAs and adjust district boundaries, particularly in the southern portion of what was the Fourth District and is now the Third District (Mount Pleasant and Columbia Heights areas), and the western portion of the Fifth District (around RFK Stadium), which is now the First District. The final set of PSAs were still small enough to support Policing for Prevention, yet large enough to increase the efficiency of staffing.

On February 24, 2004, Chief Ramsey testified before the Public Oversight Hearing on MPD’s Proposed Plan to Restructure the Police Service Areas, that the new PSA structure would put MPD in a stronger position to fight crime and make neighborhoods safer. Reducing the number of PSAs by almost half and more closely aligning the PSAs with DC neighborhoods would:
• Help the PSAs carry out a full range of crime-fighting activities, including answering calls for service, targeting crime “hot spots” and engaging the community in neighborhood problem solving;

• Give commanders the flexibility to focus their personnel resources on reducing crime;

• Improve coordination with other city service providers; and

• Provide strong and consistent leadership in all PSAs.

On May 1, 2004, MPD rolled out its boundary changes and converted its maps, business practices and district personnel to this new structure without incident. The Department still had seven police districts and three ROCs but now featured a smaller number of enlarged PSAs (44 instead of 83), a smaller pool of lieutenants supported by captains, and a plan to enhance their work with the community to reduce crime.

This document examines the PSA Boundary Realignment since implementation and evaluates MPD’s success at meeting its goals. The discussion is separated into three primary topics: staffing, deployment flexibility and support for Policing for Prevention.

I. STAFFING

A. Minimum Number of Officers in Each PSA

At the Public Oversight Hearing, MPD committed to allocating a minimum of 21 officers to each new PSA to cover all three shifts (see Exhibit 1).\(^2\) The only exception is PSA 707 (8 officers), which primarily houses Bolling Air Force Base and does not require significant MPD support.\(^3\) PSAs with greater demands for police service were given more officers than the minimum. Often, however, workload did not equate with geography; some of the smallest PSAs had the greatest percentage of crimes and calls for service, and vice versa.

MPD also promised 1 sergeant for every 8 officers; at least 1 lieutenant for each PSA, with an additional lieutenant for every 4 sergeants; and 3 captains per district (in certain districts, captains oversee PSAs with 2 or more lieutenants).

For the most part, MPD is meeting the minimum officer requirement. All but three of the PSAs (excluding PSA 707) have the minimum staffing of 21. These three PSAs are only one to two officers short of their goal. Citywide, there are 11 fewer officers in the PSAs than promised at time of implementation (1,776 versus the promised 1,787 at the 3,800 authorization level). Moreover, these figures are about to rise: on Friday, May 6, MPD will graduate 42 officers.

\(^2\)MPD offered two sets of figures in this table: the first set represented total staffing at the time, while the second represented a budget authority of 3,800 personnel. In September 2004, MPD reached its goal of 3,800 sworn members and has remained at or close to that number since. MPD continuously has recruits moving through the Institute for Police Science (IPS). As of March 11, 2005, IPS had 148 recruits.

\(^3\)The staffing level for PSA 707 was agreed to by Councilmember Allen when the Department was asked to split Bolling Air Force Base out as a separate PSA.
Twenty-five of these will go to the District 7, eight to District 6, seven to District 1 and two to District 5.

At the authorized level of 3,800 sworn members, MPD promised to commit at least two lieutenants to 11 PSAs and three captains to each district. Currently, 18 PSAs have two or more lieutenants. In addition, all of the districts except 2D (the district with the lowest workload—see Exhibit 2—has two captains) currently have three captains assigned. On the other hand, seven PSAs were promised 9 or more sergeants; only two of these (101 and 504) have achieved this minimum number. Departmentwide, there is a shortage of sergeants (27 as of March 11, 2005) that started last year and that was only partially satisfied by a promotion on September 19, 2004. Balanced against this need was the Chief’s desire to fill these positions with the best-qualified candidates. It was for this reason that he postponed the next promotional process until summer 2005 (a promotional list is expected by the end of June).

B. Ten Percent Unavailable

At the time that the boundary changes took effect, MPD also reaffirmed its commitment to not have more than 10 percent of its members unavailable per PSA at any given time. Exhibit 3 lists the total number of officers, sergeants and lieutenants available versus unavailable by district and PSA. Ten of the 45 PSAs (22.2%) had 10 percent or less of their total staffing compliment unavailable for duty, while another 13 (28.8%) have 15 percent or less unavailable.

Much of the unavailability stems from officers in less-than-full-duty status, including members on extended sick leave, limited duty and non-contact. In six out of seven of the districts, a majority of officers who are detailed are serving in a less-than-full-duty capacity. In other words, in the majority of cases, district commanders are taking steps to only detail out those who would otherwise not be able to patrol anyway because of illness, injury, etc. It is also important to note that district commanders may also—through regular practice and redeployment—move personnel between PSAs for a limited time period to areas that may have fewer full-duty personnel or who may be facing a notable crime pattern.

As Table 1 and Chart 1 on the next page demonstrate, the Department, as a whole, is at the lowest number of unavailable in several years. Indeed, MPD has reduced the total number and percentage of unavailable members through a series of personnel reforms put in place last year.

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4The Sixth District numbers exclude one sergeant and three lieutenants who have not been assigned to a particular PSA.
5“Unavailable” includes members who are detailed to another assignment, or on administrative leave, indefinite suspension, non-contact status, military leave, extended sick leave and limited duty.
Table 1: Total Number of Sworn Versus Unavailable Citywide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>Total Number Unavailable</th>
<th>Total Sworn</th>
<th>Percent Unavailable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>End of FY 2003</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>3,711</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 2004</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>3,721</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of FY 2004</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>3,760</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 1: Snapshot of Unavailable Members

II. DEPLOYMENT FLEXIBILITY

A. Putting Police Officers Where They Are Most Needed to Fight Crime

The greatest numbers of officers are assigned to the PSAs with the most demand for police services, including 101, 102, 302, 306, 501, 502, 504, 602 and 706. Although PSA 705 does not appear to have as much “work” as some of the other PSAs in terms of property crimes and total dispatched calls for service, it also rated in the top ten PSAs in terms of officer staffing because it ranked third in terms of total homicides last year (14).

Although the recent reductions in violent and property crimes cannot be entirely attributed to the PSA realignment, they do suggest MPD’s efforts are having a positive impact. Table 2 highlights the crime reductions by offense category in the year before and after the boundary changes; decreases have been noted in homicides as well as each of the DC Index crime categories:
Table 2: Homicide and Preliminary DC Index Offense Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OFFENSE TYPE</th>
<th>PRE-BOUNDARY 5/2/03-4/15/04</th>
<th>POST-BOUNDARY 5/2/04-4/15/05</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VIOLENT CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>-14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Abuse</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>-28.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault w/Deadly Weapon</td>
<td>3,684</td>
<td>3,246</td>
<td>-11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>3,936</td>
<td>3,529</td>
<td>-10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPERTY CRIME</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>4,555</td>
<td>4,079</td>
<td>-10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>7,707</td>
<td>7,061</td>
<td>-8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft F/Auto</td>
<td>8,231</td>
<td>6,837</td>
<td>-16.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stolen Auto</td>
<td>8,776</td>
<td>7,003</td>
<td>-20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL CRIME</td>
<td>37,554</td>
<td>32,241</td>
<td>-14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Homicide data: Violent Crimes Branch (VCB) information as of 4/25/05. Preliminary crime data: Geocoded Analytical Services Application (ASAP) data as of 4/22/05. The data do not represent official statistics submitted to the FBI under the Uniform Crime Reporting program (UCR) because this data could not be geocoded against the new boundaries for these time periods. All preliminary offenses are coded based on DC criminal code and not the FBI offense classifications. All statistics are subject to change due to a variety of reasons, such as a change in classification, the determination that certain offense reports were unfounded, or late reporting. Any comparisons between MPD preliminary data and the official crime statistics published by the FBI under the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR) are inaccurate and misleading.

In February 2004, MPD began the Violent Crime Focus Area (or “Hot Spot”) Initiative, which brings together the police, other city government agencies, and the private and nonprofit sectors to address the underlying conditions that can breed crime in small hot spots. While the Violent Crime Focus Area Initiative is a separate endeavor from the PSA realignment, the realignment gives commanders increased flexibility to deploy officers where they are most needed, particularly in the hot spots. This sort of focused law enforcement—is evident in the daily Crime Briefing strategies.

The results of the first 12 months of the Hot Spot Initiative indicate that crime has fallen 22 percent. Violent crime in the hot spots dropped by a staggering 34 percent, while property crime fell by 12 percent. This result suggests that the ability to place officers where they are most needed has been a success since the PSA boundaries changed.

A recent survey of MPD’s commanders indicates that the new boundaries have indeed had a positive impact on their ability to place officers in the highest crime areas. By consolidating the pool of officers into larger areas, they can more easily initiate tactical details in smaller crime areas.

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6Source: Geocoded Analytical Services Application (ASAP), preliminary DC Index Crime data as of 2/1/05.

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III. SUPPORT FOR POLICING FOR PREVENTION

A. PSA Integrity

As discussed above, one of the key components of the Policing for Prevention strategy is PSA Integrity, or the ability to keep officers in the PSAs to which they are assigned. The idea is that officers who work primarily within their boundaries are available to respond to calls for service in those areas, and by familiarizing themselves with the individuals who live and work there, can better address the issues that concern them most.

In the spring of 2003, MPD conducted a study on the degree to which officers were responding to calls within their own PSA. This was measured by calculating how often PSA units were directed by the Communications Division to respond to calls outside of their assigned PSAs (i.e., “cross-dispatched”).

The 2003 study revealed that PSA integrity was being maintained at a rate of 42 percent; in other words, 58 percent of all dispatched units were dispatched outside of their assigned PSA. During the day and evening shifts, when traditional community policing activities are most common, PSA integrity increased to 43.4 percent.

Although one of the primary components of PSA integrity is ensuring that those units assigned to a particular PSA patrol and respond to citizen requests and calls for service within that PSA during the tour of duty, there are legitimate exceptions to this practice. Analysis of calls for service data in 2003 revealed that PSA units were cross-dispatched to ensure a more immediate response to serious crimes and crimes in progress.

Regardless of these emergency situations, however, the low rate of PSA integrity—a cornerstone of the Department’s Policing for Prevention strategy—identified in 2003 led MPD to re-examine its call priority categories. At the end of FY 2003, MPD developed a new definition of Priority 1 calls. Priority 1 calls are now defined as those in which there is an imminent threat to a person’s safety or imminent potential for serious property damage. Too many calls were being responded to as Priority 1, thus taking officers away from true emergencies. In the new definition, cross-dispatching is reserved to only the most critical, in progress crime-related calls. As a result, 10 percent of dispatched calls were Priority 1 between October 1 and December 31, 2004 versus 39.6 percent the same period two years earlier.

One of the commitments MPD made in 2004 was that enlarging the PSAs would reduce the frequency with which units were dispatched out of their assigned PSA. For comparison purposes, MPD recently calculated the same statistics for all calls dispatched since the PSA boundaries changed. The results are as follows:

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7In the case of an emergency, dispatchers continue to have the authority to overwrite the system’s defaults and make other call types Priority 1. On occasion, therefore, other types of calls may appear in the response time calculation.
An analysis of PSA cruiser (i.e., “unit”) activity for the period of May 2, 2004–March 31, 2005 revealed that, on average, 36 percent of all dispatched units were dispatched outside of their assigned PSA. This is a significant drop from the 58 percent reported in CY 2003. Although MPD does not have a formal performance measure for this issue, this is a tremendous accomplishment. MPD will be analyzing these results more closely to determine if this number can be reduced, or whether this is an acceptable figure given the need for cross-PSA dispatching in times of emergency.

In addition:

- These figures have remained consistent over the past 11 months, regardless of season or particular month;
- Cross-dispatching appears to occur more in high volume districts;
- Cross-PSA dispatching occurred less often than same-PSA dispatching during all three tours of duty, with little variation between the shifts;
- A greater percentage of units responding to violent crime calls (46.6%) were cross-dispatched than were for property crime (27.9%) or traffic-related (30.8%) calls; and
- A greater percentage of the more serious priority 0 (officer in trouble) calls (60.8%) and Priority 1 (47.7%) calls were cross-dispatched, than was the case for less serious priority 2 (27.3%) or priority 3 (32.6%) calls.

B. Reduced Response Time

A related measure of the success of this project is the ability of officers to respond quickly to emergency situations, such as “in progress” robberies, rapes and burglaries.

MPD most frequently defines response time as the average response time (in minutes) from time of dispatch for Priority 1 calls to arrival of the first officer on the scene. The Department tracks this figure for Priority 1 calls each month for the Office of the City Administrator and is meeting its Fiscal Year 2005 target of 8.16 minutes (approximately 8 minutes and 10 seconds) (the average response time for the Fiscal Year-to-date as of March 2005 was 7.94 minutes).

8The source for this data was Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) data generated by 911 and 311 calls to the Office of Unified Communications (OUC). Figures represent total dispatches within the specified time period. There may be more than one unit dispatched per call-for-service event. A call-for-service event is defined as any call that requires some sort of MPD response. The analysis only includes PSA unit cars (including those used by the Asian Liaison Unit in PSA 105), mountain bike, scooter beat and foot beat patrols assigned to the PSAs. Excluded are records for which there is no event identification number (records where the dispatcher function is not related to a call-for-service event) and calls for which no PSA could be identified (approximately 2 percent of all calls).
In the seven months prior to May 2004, the average response time citywide\(^9\) was 8.14 minutes (8 minutes, 8 seconds). Between July 2004 and now,\(^10\) this figure has dropped to 7.98 minutes (7 minutes, 59 seconds).

**C. Better Coordination of Activities Between PSA Teams and Other Service Providers**

**“Hot Spot” Initiative.** As mentioned above, the realignment of the PSA boundaries has given commanders more flexibility in terms of assigning members where they need them most. This has proved particularly effective in the hot spot areas, small pockets of the city that experience a higher concentration of violent crimes. This initiative, launched in 2004 by Mayor Williams, brings together the police, a range of other city government agencies, and the private and non-profit sectors for a focused assault on both crime and the underlying conditions that can breed crime in 14 geographically compact “hot spots” located throughout DC.

The program is now in its second year, and MPD has identified new areas and continues to monitor several others. Some of the Hot Spots were still experiencing high levels of crime, even though the crime had reduced from the year before. Based on the results of an analysis based on violent crime, property crime and other factors, it was decided that of the original 14 Hot Spots, MPD would keep five as “Hot Spots”, and the remaining nine would become “Monitored Hot Spots”. In addition, MPD conducted the same analysis citywide, and identified nine new high crime areas in February 2005. The latest statistics (as of 5/7/2005) show that since implementation, crime in the five original and nine new Hot Spots has dropped 30 percent, and crime in the nine Monitored Hot Spots has dropped 6 percent, compared to the previous year.

Under the leadership of City Administrator Robert C. Bobb and Chief Ramsey, the Hot Spot Initiative has produced impressive results in a very short period of time. In addition to the crime reductions noted above, quality-of-life problems have been addressed and new social, recreational and economic development services have been developed—all in an effort to transform the hot spots into new communities.

The hot spots are located in all four quadrants of the District of Columbia and in six of the seven police districts. The individual neighborhoods vary by geography and neighborhood characteristics. Many (but not all) have sizable concentrations of public or Section 8 housing. Others are anchored by a commercial corridor. Most have entrenched drug markets. One thing all of the hot spots share in common is an intolerably high rate of crime.

The Hot Spot Initiative is a natural outgrowth of Policing for Prevention. In each PSA, the police officers, residents and other community stakeholders identify the top crime problems in their communities, and jointly develop and implement problem-solving strategies to address those problems.

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\(^9\) Excludes calls for which no district could be identified (approximately 2% of all calls). All calls are geocoded against the new boundaries to determine the length of the response to calls to the same areas would take.

\(^10\) MPD’s response time was consistent for all the months prior to the PSA boundary change as well as from July 2004 onward; however, the months of May and June were considered transition times, as the officers became used to responding to calls in their new assignments.
The Hot Spot Initiative is operated jointly by the Metropolitan Police Department and the Mayor's Office of Neighborhood Services. In each hot spot, MPD assigns additional patrols (vehicle, bicycle and foot), deploys specialized units (such as narcotics, gangs, prostitution and vehicle theft), conducts criminal investigations and manages problem-solving efforts. Neighborhood Services coordinates the efforts of other government agencies through individual Coordinators assigned to each of DC’s eight wards.

Depending on the nature of the problems in each hot spot, a combination of the following resources may also be used:

- Regulatory agencies such as the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Services enforce building and commercial establishment codes;
- Infrastructure agencies such as the Departments of Public Works and Transportation clean trash and graffiti, tow abandoned cars and fix streetlights and traffic signals;
- Recreational and human services agencies provide a range of facilities and programs that meet the communities’ needs;
- Economic development agencies conduct job fairs, training and other services to enhance employment and commercial development;
- Prosecution agencies ensure that criminal cases of high importance to the community are given special attention; and
- Community stakeholders – including clergy, businesses, social services and others – provide a range of intervention services and programs for youth, families and seniors.

Throughout the process, residents, community leaders and other stakeholders are kept apprised of ongoing developments in the hot spots. The community provides ongoing feedback and assistance.

Enhanced Community Outreach. MPD’s Policing for Prevention Unit reports that immediately after the implementation of the new PSA boundaries, there was a surge in interest and participation from the community. Community members were curious about their new PSA boundaries and were interested in meeting the PSA officers and managers.

Through that Unit’s Capital Community Partnership Project (CCPP), civilian Community Outreach Coordinators are placed in police districts to perform community outreach in Hot Spot locations throughout the city. For citizens, the Community Outreach Coordinator facilitates MPD’s commitment to community policing. The program has created more community-police partnerships, leading to increased satisfaction with police service. The Community Outreach Coordinators are now fully staffed.

The CCPP, in conjunction with MPD’s Corporate Communications area, has developed information and resource kits to be distributed to the PSAs. The kits contain information such as
how to contact your neighborhood police and how to file a police report. MPD aims to distribute
the information kits in the summer of 2005.

To further encourage community participation, MPD has developed email bulletin boards, or
“listervs” in each district. An article in the Washington Post on March 13, 2005, “Email Sites
Enlist Neighborhood Crime Fighters”, detailed the success of the listervs in getting the
community, city officials and police involved in discussions about crime in their neighborhood.
Membership and participation is increasing each week, with most districts having in excess of
100 members. District 3 has over 260 members.

In addition to the district listervs, MPD has new online calendar systems where the community
can check on upcoming events in their district. In 2004, the Office of the Chief Technology
Officer (OCTO) implemented a new online calendar system citywide. MPD was given eight
different calendar systems—one for each district and one citywide calendar. MPD conducted
training in each district on the management of online calendars.

A comment from MPD’s recent survey of commanders supported the notion that the new
boundaries have fostered improved coordination of activities between the Department and other
city service providers:

“The CORE Team, the ANC groups and the PSAs are working together much better then
ever before. Because the PSAs are divided along Ward and community boundaries the
ANCs are more willing to work with the PSA officials to get things done.”

D. More Direct Role for Captains in Community Policing

Captains play a unique role in the Policing for Prevention process. They ensure attendance at,
and regular scheduling of PSA meetings, delegate Action Plan assignments, and ensure that
Action Plan items are completed on schedule and that staffing is available to support these tasks.
In addition, they coach sergeants and officers to improve their performance. MPD’s Policing for
Prevention Unit reports that community groups believe captains are playing an increasing role in
responding to the community. Using the listervs community members are able to contact
captains directly, and comments from the community have been positive. In addition, MPD has
promoted the more direct role for captains within and updated the Policing for Prevention
General Order (GO-OPS-204.10).

E. Strong and Consistent Leadership in Every PSA

MPD has retrained every PSA lieutenant and captain in their Policing for Prevention role. ROC
Chiefs and commanders were also given training on Policing for Prevention standards,
accountability, principles and professionalism.

The results of the commander survey indicated that they believe leadership in their PSAs has
either stayed the same or improved. One of the commanders said “the lieutenants that we have
running the PSAs are now much more dedicated to their communities and by having field lieutenants to handle some of the day-to-day tasks, they can focus on the PSA issues.”

F. Action Plans With Concrete Timelines

An Action Plan is a vehicle for documenting how the Policing for Prevention strategy is implemented. Two important tools for developing effective PSA Action Plans are the PSA community meetings and the Partnerships for Problem Solving (PPS) group meetings. These meetings provide the PSA opportunities to meet with the community, discuss crime and disorder problems and engage in problem solving in partnership with other members of the Department, members of the community, other law enforcement agencies, city service agencies and other stakeholders. MPD has taken steps to ensure that each new PSA lieutenant has been trained on how to prepare and maintain effective PSA plans.

Feedback from the survey of PSA commanders showed mixed results as to whether they thought the PSAs hold more meetings than before the boundary change, and whether PSA Action Plans are being updated and maintained. Some commanders reported that while PSA meetings are held more frequently than before the boundary changes, others noted that some of the PSAs are naturally splitting into smaller areas to accommodate neighborhood issues that might not be represented in a larger PSA meeting.

SUMMARY

Overall the PSA Boundary realignment has successfully met its goals and objectives. The Department is meeting its minimum staffing commitments in terms of officers and lieutenants in most of the PSAs. At the same time, cross-PSA dispatching has been reduced and response time has dropped. Additional MPD programs—including the Hot Spot Initiative—although not directly related to the PSA boundary changes, are thriving as well, in part because managers have increased flexibility in terms of deployment. Finally, citizens are better notified about the date and location of PSA meetings, and have greater access through the listservs to MPD members.

During the daily Crime Briefings, MPD is supplementing the benefits achieved from the boundaries with additional discretionary staffing efforts where members are most needed, whether assigned from the Canine Division, Focus Mission Teams, Mobile Force, Redeployment or Horse Mounted Patrol. All of these efforts have contributed toward a reduction of crime and enhanced quality of life in the District of Columbia.

This is not to say that there aren’t still areas that need further improvement. MPD will continue to work toward reducing the percentage of PSA members in a less-than-full-duty status, increasing the frequency with which MPD holds its PSA meetings, ensuring minutes are taken at these meetings and disseminated back to the community, updating PSA plans regularly, and maintaining the highest quality of supervision in the PSAs.